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Interest of the Amici Curiae 
 
Amici are law professors who teach and have written extensively on 
trademark law. Amici have no stake in the outcome of this case.2 Our sole interest 
in this case is in the orderly development of trademark law in a way that serves the 
public interest by promoting competition and protecting free expression. 
 
Source of Authority of Amici Curiae to File 
 
Appellants/Cross-Appellees consented to the filing of this brief, but 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant did not. Therefore, a motion for leave of Court to file 
this brief is submitted herewith in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 29(a). 
 
 
  
                                                           
2
 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no such 
counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or 
submission of this brief. No person other than amici curiae or their counsel made 
a monetary contribution intended to fund its preparation or submission.  
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Summary of the Argument 
 
The District Court properly held that New Life Art’s (“New Life”) creative 
works do not infringe the University of Alabama’s (“the University”) rights in the 
trade dress of its football uniforms, including the their crimson and white colors.  
First, New Life’s realistic depiction of the University’s football games is not likely 
to confuse consumers about the source of New Life’s goods, or as to the 
University’s sponsorship of or affiliation with those goods.  Confusion is 
actionable under the Lanham Act only when it relates to these types of source 
relationships, and not when consumers merely recognize the plaintiff’s mark.  
Second, even if some amount of confusion about a relationship between the 
University and New Life did exist, that confusion would be irrelevant if it was 
unlikely to affect consumers’ decisions to purchase art from New Life Art.  Third, 
the District Court rightly held that the University’s football uniforms and colors are 
aesthetically functional as used by New Life.  Fourth, and finally, New Life’s 
expressive works are protected under the First Amendment and cannot be deemed 
infringing. 
Argument 
 
I. The District Court Correctly Found that Confusion is Unlikely 
 
A. Only Confusion Relating to the Source, Sponsorship, or Affiliation of 
New Life’s Works is Actionable 
 
 3  
 
The District Court properly rejected the University’s sweeping assertion that 
Moore’s realistic renditions of notable football plays violate the University’s 
trademark rights simply because consumers will recognize the uniforms depicted 
in Moore’s paintings as those of Alabama’s football team. To the extent the 
District Court concluded that any image of University events inherently created 
some possibility of confusion simply because the University's uniforms were 
correctly depicted, it was relying on outdated readings of Boston Professional 
Hockey v. Dallas Cap and Emblem Manufacturing, 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975) 
and University of Georgia Athletic Association v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 
1985), readings that have been repudiated by the Fifth Circuit and are inconsistent 
with subsequent Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit cases. This court should 
correct that mistake.   
The University argues, and the District Court partially accepted, that New 
Life’s works are likely to cause confusion because the uniforms depicted in 
Moore’s paintings were the “triggering mechanism” for a sale.3  This claim, 
however, ignores the fact that the Lanham Act requires a focus on the source of the 
goods at issue.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).   The plain language of section 43(a) 
limits claims to uses that are likely to cause confusion of very particular types, 
specifically confusion as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such 
                                                           
3
 Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 28.  
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person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or 
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.” 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(a)(1)(A).  And this court has made the focus on the source of goods clear. 
“Our cases have established two elements that [plaintiff] had to prove to merit 
injunctive relief under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act: (1) that it has trademark rights 
in the mark or name at issue; and (2) that the defendant adopted a mark or name 
that was the same, or confusingly similar to the plaintiff's mark, such that there was 
a likelihood of confusion for consumers as to the proper origin of the goods created 
by the defendant's use of the [mark] in his trade.”  Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 
F.2d 1508, 1512 (11th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).4 
It is no accident that trademark law focuses tightly on confusion regarding 
the source of goods.5 It does so because the purpose of trademark law, in contrast 
with patent and copyright, is not to reward innovation or creativity. See TrafFix 
Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001) (“The Lanham Act 
does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation …”).  Instead, 
                                                           
4
 Amici Curiae University of Arkansas et al. (collectively “University Amici”) 
mischaracterize this fundamental principle of trademark law, claiming “[a] bedrock 
principle of trademark law is an owner’s right of control the use of its marks.”  
Amicus at 5.  Notwithstanding their desire to control all uses of their marks, 
trademark owners have never had such plenary control.  Setting aside dilution, 
which is not at issue here, mark owners are entitled only to control uses of a mark 
that are likely to confuse consumers about the source of another’s goods.   
5
 We use “source” here to include all the source relationships iterated in section 
43(a) – source, sponsorship, affiliation, etc.   
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trademark law is intended to facilitate the operation of a competitive marketplace 
by preventing sellers from misrepresenting to consumers who is responsible for 
products or services.  Id. (“by preventing competitors from copying a source-
identifying mark, [trademark law] reduce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and 
making purchasing decisions, and helps assure a producer that it (and not an 
imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated 
with a desirable product”) (internal quotations omitted).  Hence, the limited nature 
of trademark rights is not some antiquated legal doctrine; it derives from the core 
purpose of trademark law.   
Boston Hockey and Laite departed from these principles in suggesting that 
trademark infringement could occur when consumers are confused as to the source 
of a trademark, rather than the product bearing that mark.  Most courts after Boston 
Hockey and Laite have realized, however, that those cases were inconsistent with 
trademark law’s purposes and have construed the cases narrowly.  In Kentucky 
Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., for example, the court 
expressly declined to read Boston Hockey as doing away with the confusion 
requirement, noting that the plaintiff’s singular emphasis on the “certain 
knowledge that the [plaintiff was the] source and origin of the trademark symbols” 
pressed Boston Hockey too far.  549 F.2d 368, 389 (5th Cir. 1977) (“By 
emphasizing this one phrase from our comprehensive opinion, Boston Hockey 
 6  
 
could therefore be read to dispose of the confusion issue here. We decline, 
however, to adopt that reading. Boston Hockey also reiterated our unbroken 
insistence on a showing of confusion, and we believe that our opinion must be read 
in that context.”).  See also Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J. H. 
Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d 1079, 1082 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining that even 
post-Boston Hockey “a claimant must still prove a likelihood of confusion, mistake 
or deceit of ‘typical’ purchasers, or potential purchasers, as to the connection of the 
trademark owner with the infringing product”) (emphasis added). 
Likewise, trademark law’s unquestioned approval of truthful comparative 
advertising and advertising of replacement parts demonstrates that the only 
actionable “triggering mechanism” is consumers’ belief that the plaintiff is the 
source of the defendant’s goods.  Were this not so, comparative advertising that 
informed consumers of the existence of generic versions of branded drugs would 
be infringing, since there would be a causal relationship between the use of the 
mark and consumers’ choice of the generic.  See 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:52 (4th ed. 2010) (explaining U.S. law’s 
preference for informing consumers through truthful comparisons even if that 
diverts business from the trademark owner).  Indeed, comparative advertising can 
even take the form of similar trade dress, so long as it is not so similar it causes 
source confusion. McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 511 
 7  
 
F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2007) (contrasting noninfringing and infringing store-brand 
packaging). Similarly with replacement parts: without using the trademark, the 
seller can’t identify its own goods, and thus there is a causal relationship between 
use of the mark and the sale.  Cf. B.H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts Co., 
451 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir.1971) (approving truthful claims about replacement parts).  
The causation/triggering mechanism argument only holds when it is based on 
source confusion.  See Custom Mfg. and Engineering, Inc. v. Midway Services, 
Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Unlike the general prohibition against 
unauthorized copying that exists in patent and copyright law, the touchstone of 
liability in a trademark infringement action is not simply whether there is 
unauthorized use of a protected mark, but whether such use is likely to cause 
consumer confusion.”). 
If there was any remaining doubt that the confusion inquiry must focus on 
the source of goods, it was relieved by the Supreme Court in Dastar Corp. v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).  Like this case, Dastar 
involved a claim that the content of a creative work implicitly suggested the source 
of that work.  Specifically, Twentieth Century Fox argued that use of footage from 
Twentieth Century Fox’s television series without attribution falsely suggested that 
Dastar was the source of the content.  Id. at 27. The Supreme Court rejected that 
claim, declaring it “out of accord with the history and purpose of the Lanham Act 
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and inconsistent with precedent.”  Id. at 32.  The Lanham Act does not address 
claims about the source of creative work, or components thereof; it focuses only on 
confusion regarding the source of goods. Id. at 39 (“We do not think the Lanham 
Act requires this search for the source of the Nile and all its tributaries.”); see also 
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 112 
(2004) (holding that the Lanham Act requires "a showing that the defendant’s 
actual practice is likely to produce confusion in the minds of consumers about the 
origin of the goods or services in question") (emphasis added).  According to 
Dastar, the relevant goods for purposes of a claim under section 43(a) are the 
physical copies that circulate in commerce and not the underlying creative works. 
Id. at 37. In Dastar, that meant that the relevant question was whether consumers 
would be confused about the source of the videotapes Dastar was selling.6 
Dastar intended to rein in vague claims of confusion precisely like the one at 
issue in this case and to make clear that valid trademark claims are predicated on 
confusion about source.  But rather than heeding Dastar and the other more recent 
cases, the University actually urges this court to adopt a standard that goes beyond 
even Boston Hockey.  See Boston Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1011 (“We need not deal 
here with the concept of whether every artistic reproduction of the symbol would 
infringe upon plaintiff’s rights.  We restrict ourselves to the emblems  . . . .”).   
                                                           
6
 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37-38. 
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The fact that most consumers purchase New Life’s products because they 
contain realistic depictions of the University’s indicia does not change this result.  
In fact, this is precisely where Boston Hockey and Laite’s broad claims were 
misguided:  the fact that some feature is the “triggering mechanism” for purchase 
does not necessarily mean others’ use of that feature is infringing.  The feature at 
issue must be the triggering mechanism because consumers believe the use of the 
mark indicates the source of the defendant’s goods.  In other words, the relevant 
question is not simply “would consumers buy the painting if it did not use the 
University’s marks?”  It is instead “do consumers believe the defendant’s inclusion 
of the features at issue suggests to consumers that the University has sponsored or 
endorsed New Life’s paintings?”  Cf. Order of Rainbow for Girls, 676 F.2d at 1084 
(“The fact that purchasers purchased Rainbow jewelry as a direct result of the 
presence of the Rainbow emblem does not compel the conclusion that they did so 
believing that the jewelry was in any way endorsed, sponsored, approved or 
otherwise associated with Rainbow, given the court’s findings.”); Anheuser-Busch, 
Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 322 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that intent to 
profit is not the same thing as intent to confuse and stating it “[could not] assume 
that the commercial success of the . . . [defendant’s] T-shirt resulted from 
consumer confusion; consumers may have been moved to buy the T-shirt by the 
simple fact that they were amused by the cleverness of its design.”). 
 10  
 
If it were otherwise, no one could realistically depict any sporting event 
without violating some teams’ trademark rights.  Indeed, no one could ever depict 
a trademark at all without permission.  To say that a party infringes when 
consumers know the mark originates with the mark owner is to say the mark owner 
owns all uses of a mark in which the mark is recognizable.  When a newspaper 
writes about the University of Alabama, readers recognize the University’s name 
as a mark of the University.  By the University’s logic, it would have a prima facie 
trademark claim there too.  A headline that caught a fan’s attention and worked as 
a “triggering mechanism” to buy a newspaper would lead to trademark liability.7 
Consumer Reports magazine would be exposed to liability every time someone 
bought a magazine for a branded product review.  
In all these cases, the defendant could be saved only by arguing that the use 
was not a “use in commerce” or that it was protected by fair use or the First 
Amendment (all of which, not incidentally, are arguments the University also 
rejects).  The prima facie case should not be interpreted in ways that put such 
pressure on these nebulous defenses.  
As applied here, for Alabama to sustain a claim it must be clear that 
consumers regard the presence of the Alabama marks as an indication that 
                                                           
7
 See Southwest Recreational Industries, Inc. v. FieldTurf, No. 01-50073, 2002 WL 
32783971 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 2002); New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub., 
Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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Alabama is the source or sponsor of the physical copies of Moore’s works of art.  
Specifically, the University of Alabama must show that Moore’s inclusion of the 
Alabama marks in his paintings is likely to confuse consumers about a relationship 
between Moore and the University or about the University’s sponsorship or 
approval of Mr. Moore’s goods.  It simply is not enough to claim that consumers 
will recognize the marks as marks of the University.  Nor is it enough to say that 
consumers might believe the University sponsored or is affiliated with the works 
simply because the uniforms appear as part of the images Moore created.  Cf. 
Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith System Mfg. Corp., 419 F.3d 576 , 581 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(stating that, under Dastar, “[t]he right question … is whether the consumer knows 
who has produced the finished product” and rejecting the plaintiff’s claim because 
the purchaser of the defendant’s table knew that the defendant was the producer of 
the actual, tangible product (regardless of who supplied the components of the 
table). 
B. Some Confusion is Irrelevant 
Even if the University could show that consumers are likely to be confused 
about the source of the physical goods sold by New Life, that confusion should be 
regarded as irrelevant absent some reason to think it would materially affect 
consumers’ purchasing decisions.  As the District Court found, Moore’s artistic 
conception of his subject matter sells the works at issue.  There is simply no reason 
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to think that consumers care what sort of contractual relationship, if any, New Life 
has with the University, or that they would ever even think about licensing when 
buying art.  Confusion that has no bearing on any decisions consumers make is, 
like confusion over whether Pluto is or is not a planet, not something in which the 
Lanham Act should take an interest. 
As the Supreme Court held in Dastar, the Lanham Act “should not be 
stretched to cover matters that are typically of no consequence to purchasers.” 539 
U.S. at 33.  And as some courts have recognized, sponsorship or affiliation in the 
context of university merchandise is unlikely to be of consequence.  In Board of 
Governors of the University of North Carolina v. Helpingstine, for example, the 
court rejected the University of North Carolina’s claim against a t-shirt 
manufacturer that sold merchandise bearing the university’s marks, stating 
Given that there is a distinct possibility that individuals who buy 
products from Johnny T-Shirt do not base their decision upon whether 
the product is sponsored or endorsed by UNC-CH and that Plaintiffs 
bear the burden of establishing likelihood of confusion, the court 
holds that UNC-CH must meet its burden by showing more than 
simply the identity of the marks. Instead, it must provide evidence 
establishing that individuals do make the critical distinction as to 
sponsorship or endorsement, or direct evidence of actual 
confusion.”). 
 
714 F. Supp. 167, 173 (M.D.N.C. 1989).  
Following Dastar, this Circuit has also explicitly recognized that the 
Lanham Act targets only confusion by the purchasing public, not non-purchasers, 
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because only purchasers’ confusion could cause the kind of harm that trademark 
law aims to prevent.  Custom Mfg. and Eng’g, 508 F.3d at 650-51; cf. id. at 652 
(“We reject such a theory of infringement in a vacuum, as liability under the 
Lanham Act is properly tied to the real-world context in which the alleged 
trademark use occurs.”).  It follows that confusion that is not tied to a purchase 
decision—no matter in whose mind it exists—is equally irrelevant to the Lanham 
Act. 
Materiality is particularly important in cases of expressive works because it 
is very likely that consumers will be motivated to purchase the work by the quality 
of the artistic expression and not by their belief as to who authorized the physical 
good.  See Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[M]ost 
theater-goers have sufficient awareness that the quality of a musical depends so 
heavily on a combination of circumstances, including script, score, lyrics, cast, and 
direction, that they are not likely to be significantly influenced in their ticket-
purchasing decision by an erroneous belief that the musical emanated from the 
same production source as the underlying work.”).   
Here, in light of Moore’s own artistic reputation and his prominent use of his 
name on each painting, there is simply no reason to think that consumers care what 
sort of contractual relationship, if any, New Life has with the University, or that 
they would even think about such a relationship when making decisions.  Cf., e.g., 
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Nabisco, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that 
prominent use of the defendant’s own name diminished the chance of confusion).  
Indeed there is good evidence any such confusion is irrelevant to consumers:  New 
Life sold unlicensed art for almost many years to no apparent harm.   
Focusing on materiality also should inform the scope of relief even if the 
court believes some confusion is relevant.  Specifically, even if the Court 
concludes that some small number of consumers may care about the University’s 
relationship to Moore’s work, that concern can be addressed simply by prohibiting 
New Life from making any explicit statement (such as “Officially Licensed by the 
University of Alabama”) that suggests authorization.  Indeed, that distinction 
between licensed an unlicensed work, which New Life has diligently made, has 
clearly been successful in preventing any harm for these many years. 
 
II. The District Court Property Held that New Life’s Works Are Protected 
Works 
 
If New Life had been offering educational services using the University of 
Alabama’s name, or fielded a collegiate athletic team using the allegedly 
distinctive uniform colors, the considerations in this case might be different, 
though in the latter instance many other teams might have arguments of their own. 
But Moore is an artist whose paintings represent an entire scene taken from reality.  
 15  
 
Trademark law was not intended to prohibit artists like Moore from depicting 
individuals in their work simply because those individuals are wearing 
trademarked apparel.  Indeed, audiences are interested in Moore’s work precisely 
because they are realistic depictions of actual events.   
We think the District Court rightly concluded that the University’s football 
uniforms are functional as used by New Life, and that New Life’s art is protected 
by a fair use defense.  But whether the doctrinal tool is functionality (because 
uniform colors are essential to the purpose of representing an element of the 
world); aesthetic functionality (because New Life has a non-reputation-related 
interest in providing a feature consumers want); nominative fair use in the spirit of 
Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003); or a 
First Amendment-based defense like the one in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F. 2d 994 
(2d Cir. 1989), the point is the same: Trademark law recognizes that claims of 
source confusion must be rejected when they interfere with substantial policies 
ensuring freedom to speak or to compete.  
 
A. The District Court Correctly Held that the University’s Marks are 
Aesthetically Functional as Used by New Life 
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The District Court properly concluded that the New Life used the Alabama 
colors primarily for a functional purpose.8 Moore’s intent, as the District Court 
found, “was to paint interesting plays.”  (Doc. 311 at 11).  Painting interesting 
plays in an Alabama football game necessitates depiction of Alabama football 
uniforms, which serve the non-source-related function of making the painting 
realistic.   
As this court recognized in Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution, 
LLC, 369 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2004), the Supreme Court has identified two 
different types of functionality: (1) mechanical or utilitarian functionality; and (2) 
aesthetic functionality.  See TrafFix, 532 U.S. 23.  Features are functional in the 
first, utilitarian sense when they are “essential to the use or purpose of the article or 
… [affect] the cost or quality of the article.” Id. at 32; Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson 
Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995).  Aesthetically functional features, on the 
other hand, are features valued by consumers for non-source-related reasons such 
that “‘exclusive use of the feature at issue would put competitors at a significant 
non-reputation-related disadvantage.’’” TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33.9   
                                                           
8
 As the University of Alabama’s uniform colors are unregistered, the University 
bears the burden of proving that the claimed features are not functional.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)(3). 
9
 University Amici downplay TrafFix by claiming the Court’s discussion of 
“aesthetic functionality” was mere dicta.  University Amicus at 19, fn 7.  In fact, 
the distinction between utilitarian and aesthetic functionality was an important part 
of the Court’s holding that competitive necessity need not be considered when the 
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Utilitarian functionality serves two purposes. “First, by ensuring that 
competitors remain free to copy useful product features, it prevents the trademark 
law from undermining its own pro-competitive objectives.  Second, the 
functionality doctrine prevents the trademark law from conflicting with the patent 
law by eliminating trademark monopolies of potentially unlimited duration on a 
product's utilitarian features.” See Wilhelm Pudenz, GmbH v. Littlefuse, Inc., 177 
F.3d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted).  Aesthetic 
functionality shares only one of these concerns.  It is not concerned with patent law 
because aesthetic functionality focuses on features that are not mechanically 
necessary for the operation of the product at issue. But because it deals with 
features that are necessary because of a market constraint imposed by consumer 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
feature is functional under the “traditional rule.”  TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33.  The 
Sixth Circuit’s holding that the dual-spring design at issue in TrafFix was not 
functional was based on its judgment that the feature was not competitively 
necessary.  Id. at 32 (“The Court of Appeals in the instant case seemed to interpret 
this language to mean that a necessary test for functionality is ‘‘whether the 
particular product configuration is a competitive necessity.’’) (citations omitted). 
In reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that 
competitive need was relevant once the traditional test of functionality was 
established.  By contrast, it made clear that the competitive need inquiry is proper 
in aesthetic functionality cases.  Id. at 33. Moreover, it is irrelevant whether the 
University Amici agree with the Supreme Court that aesthetic functionality was the 
issue in Qualitex.  See University Amicus at 19, n. 7 (suggesting that TrafFix was 
about the issue in Qualitex).  The point is that the TrafFix Court acknowledged the 
existence of both types of functionality. 
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expectations,10 aesthetic functionality strongly implicates the first of the two 
purposes of the utilitarian functionality doctrine.  See Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, 
Inc. 560 F Supp. (S.D. Iowa), aff’d, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding the color 
green for farm equipment functional based upon evidence that farmers preferred 
their farm equipment to be in matching colors); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c (1995) (defining features as aesthetically functional 
“[w]hen aesthetic considerations play an important role in the purchasing decisions 
of prospective consumers,” and a particular design feature “substantially 
contributes to the aesthetic appeal of a product”). And that is why the Supreme 
Court focused the inquiry in aesthetic functionality cases on the competitive effects 
of exclusive use.  TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32-33. Aesthetic functionality therefore 
considers whether consumers demand certain features such that “exclusive use [of 
those features] would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage.”  Id.  
 This court applied the lessons of TrafFix in Dippin’ Dots, finding that  
the color, shape, and size of dippin' dots [have] ‘aesthetic functions’ 
that easily satisfy the competitive necessity test because precluding 
competitors like FBD from copying any of these aspects of dippin' 
dots would eliminate all competitors in the flash-frozen ice cream 
                                                           
10
 As in fact utilitarian functionality is ultimately dependent on consumer desires.  
No object is functional unless a consumer wants to do something with it: even a 
wheel only has value because people want to use it, which is why roller skates can 
be functional even if there are more efficient, safer, and more pleasant ways to 
travel.  
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market, which would be the ultimate non-reputation-related 
disadvantage. 
 
Dippin’ Dots, 369 F.3d at 1203 n. 7. And while the shape and size of dippin’ dots 
could be viewed as mechanically functional, ice cream colors are functional purely 
in the aesthetic sense.  Dippin’ Dots’ color code was based on flavor, and certain 
flavors generally are denoted with particular colors.  But coloring of the flash-
frozen ice cream was not compelled by its ingredients or the method by which it 
was made.  In fact, the coloring is completely artificial, so there is no reason the 
defendant could not have made its strawberry-flavored ice cream purple.11  The 
defendant’s need to use pink was purely a function of consumer expectations: a 
substantial number of consumers want their strawberry-flavored ice cream to be 
pink.   
Inability to use Alabama’s uniform colors would put New Life at a similarly 
significant, non-reputation-related disadvantage.  Indeed, the fact that most 
consumers purchase New Life’s products because they contain realistic depictions 
of the Alabama football uniforms actually demonstrates New Life’s competitive 
need.  As the University emphasizes, if New Life were to make the University’s 
jerseys purple, Alabama fans would not want them.  See Brief of Appellee/Cross-
                                                           
11
 For this reason University Amici are wrong when they claim, contrary to the 
express language of the decision, “color shape and size of the flash-frozen ice 
cream beads at issue did not serve ‘aesthetic functions’ but utilitarian ones.”  
University Amicus at 15, note 4.   
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Appellant at 29.  But consumers wouldn’t want a painting of a purple Statue of 
Liberty, and for the same reason:  consumers want realistic depictions of real-
world things, and neither the Statue of Liberty nor the University of Alabama’s 
uniforms are purple. Other colors simply are no substitute for accurately depicting 
Alabama’s Crimson and White, and it is accurate depiction, rather than source 
identification, over which the University here seeks a monopoly.12 
This is precisely the understanding of competitive necessity that motivated 
this court in Dippin’ Dots, where, in rejecting the claim that the defendant had 
other design features available to it, this court said: 
DDI's argument that FBD could still compete in the ice cream market 
by producing, e.g., soft-serve ice cream, which would not have many 
of the same functional elements as dippin' dots and thus would not 
infringe upon DDI's product trade dress, is unavailing. FBD does not 
want to compete in the ice cream business; it wants to compete in the 
flash-frozen ice cream business, which is in a different market from 
more traditional forms of ice cream. 
 
369 F.3d at 1204.  In the same way, New Life could have used different colors.  
But if it did so, it would have been selling a different product.  Fans of Alabama 
football want pictures of Alabama football players, and it is cold comfort to say 
that New Life can sell pictures of non-Alabama football players.  See Publ’ns Int’l, 
                                                           
12
 This point is further established by the District Court’s finding that “the plays 
and Moore’s reputation established during a period when his art was agreeably not 
licensed are what predominantly trigger the sales” of his paintings.  (Doc. 311 at 
7).  Barring him from depicting reality would hamper his ability to use his own 
talents and reputation to produce art. 
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Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 342 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the plaintiff’s 
claim that the allegedly infringing cookbooks' pages could have been gilded a color 
other than gold, which was the color of the plaintiff's cookbooks' gilded pages, 
because “[g]old connotes opulence” and is “a natural color to use on a fancy 
cookbook”).13 
The University, and University Amici, seek to avoid this conclusion by 
arguing that any disadvantage New Life would suffer if it was not entitled to use 
Alabama’s team colors are reputation-related.  See University Amicus at 13-14.  
But this argument mischaracterizes the role of “reputation” here.  When the 
Supreme Court said that the functionality doctrine protects competitors only 
against a “non-reputation-related” disadvantage, it did not mean that the features at 
issue could not evoke a mark holder or its reputation.  Every use of a mark that 
consumers recognize as a reference to the mark holder implicates reputation in this 
sense.  The “reputation” that matters is a reputation as a source of goods or 
services.  " 
                                                           
13
 In fact the plaintiff in Dippin Dots argued, and this Court rejected, an argument 
specifically about colors that was much like the one the University presses here.  
Dippin’ Dots claimed that, even if the defendant needed to use certain colors 
generally, it did not need to copy the “identical Pantone color” used by Dippin 
Dots.  The court expressly rejected that argument.  Dippin’ Dots, 369 F.3d at 1205 
n.9.  This too was consistent with the Supreme Court’s instruction in TrafFix that, 
once a feature is functional, alternative design possibilities need not be considered.  
See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33-34 
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The relevant question is whether the disadvantage that New Life would 
suffer if it could not depict the University’s marks relates to an attempt to benefit 
from the reputation of the University by using its mark to indicate the source of 
artistic goods or whether instead the disadvantage would flow from New Life’s 
inability to engage in expression unrelated to indicating the source of the goods.  
And the proper focus here is on the role those features play as used by New 
Life.  Some courts have misunderstood this and have refused to find aesthetic 
functionality when the defendant has made use of a feature that unambiguously 
serves as a trademark when used to denote the plaintiff’s goods or services on the 
theory the aesthetic function cannot be separated from source indication.  See, e.g., 
Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. College v. Smack Apparel 
Co., 550 F.3d 465, 486 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2759 (2009) 
(affirming the District Court’s holding that the plaintiff universities’ color 
schemes, logos, and designs had no significance other than to identify the 
Universities and were therefore nonfunctional); Automotive Gold, Inc. v. 
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 
549 U.S. 1282 (2007) (refusing to declare plaintiff’s logo functional when used to 
adorn a key chain, even while recognizing that “[c]onsumers sometimes buy 
products bearing marks such as the Nike Swoosh, the Playboy bunny ears, the 
Mercedes tri-point star, the Ferrari stallion, and countless sports franchise logos, 
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for the appeal of the mark itself, without regard to whether it signifies the origin or 
sponsorship of the product.”).   
These decisions miss the mark because they focus on the role the features at 
issue play when used by the plaintiffs as an indicator of the source of their 
products.  The fact that a product feature is non-functional in some contexts, 
however, does not necessarily mean that the feature is non-functional for all 
purposes.  The aesthetic functionality doctrine, at its core, is concerned about the 
consequences of giving one party exclusive rights to a feature that may harm 
others' ability to offer products with features that consumers want.  Where the 
plaintiff and defendant compete directly, the consequence of a finding of aesthetic 
functionality will be to bar trademark protection for the feature altogether.  See 
Deere, 560 F.Supp. 85.  But this will not always be so:  the defendant in a 
particular case might need access to a particular feature for a different reason than 
the plaintiff, leaving the trademark perfectly valid in its primary market, but 
functional within the context of the defendant's use. See Rosetta Stone, Ltd. v. 
Google, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00736-GBL-TCB slip. op. (E.D. Va. August 3, 2010) 
(finding Google's particular use of trademarked keywords as triggers for paid 
advertisements functional even though the terms clearly operated as trademarks for 
the plaintiff’s goods).  It is the defendant's non-source-related need, in such cases, 
that triggers the aesthetic functionality doctrine.  When, as here, the defendant is 
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depicting a mark as part of a larger work depicting real-life events, the 
information-conveying function of the use can readily be distinguished from a 
source or sponsorship message. 
At bottom, the University’s functionality argument, like its argument 
regarding relevant confusion, boils down to a simple contention that New Life’s 
ability to use the colors of Alabama’s football uniforms allows New Life to gain a 
benefit for which the University would charge a licensing fee if it could.14  But this 
circular claim to a licensing market does not justify the right they seek.  See 
generally, Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 Mich. L. 
Rev. __ (forthcoming 2010) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1604845). Where, as here, 
the trademark is used by the defendant primarily as a desirable feature of a product 
rather than to indicate the source of its own goods, “competition suffers – and 
consumers pay – if other sellers are shut out of the market for that feature.”15  
 
                                                           
14
 The University’s professed concern for its image is certainly not evident in its 
licensed rivalry figurines showing arch-enemy Auburn humiliating the Tide 
mascot, uniforms, and colors.  See http://www.elitedeals.com/mem-col-au-072-
400.html (uniforms); http://www.elitedeals.com/mem-col-au-051-400.html 
(mascot wearing uniform: "It is hand painted in team colors and, as you can see, 
show the mascot squeezing the rival mascot for all he's worth. See how scared that 
other mascot looks? Now that's funny."); 
http://www.footballfanatics.com/COLLEGE_Auburn_Tigers/Auburn_Tigers_Crun
chtime_Rivalry_Figurine (Tide colors).  Many of the University Amici license 
similarly humiliating treatments, available for purchase at the same sites. 
15
 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right:  Fragile Theory 
or Fait Accompli?, 54 Emory L.J. 461, 465 (2004)  
 25  
 
B. The District Court Properly Held New Life’s Paintings Are Protected 
Expression 
Amici are in agreement with Amici Curiae American Society of Media 
Photographers, Inc. and Alabama Press Association that the University’s position 
puts the Lanham Act in needless conflict with the First Amendment.  We therefore 
only add the following observations: Broad claims to control untethered from 
material confusion regarding the source of goods or services pose particular risks 
to free expression. In fact, while all aspects of trademark law can pose First 
Amendment threats, it is no accident that the worst problems don’t come from 
traditional suits against the sale of competing products, but rather from claims that 
try to stretch the concept of confusion to cover creative works by using the rubric 
of sponsorship or affiliation. 
With the importance of brand image in today’s economy, trademarks “form 
an important part of the public dialog on economic and social issues.”16 Restricting 
this speech is harmful to society. As Judge Kozinski has noted, “[m]uch useful 
social and commercial discourse w[ill] be all but impossible if speakers [are] under 
threat of an infringement lawsuit every time they ma[k]e reference to a person, 
                                                           
16. 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:146; see also 
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(“‘[T]rademarks offer a particularly powerful means of conjuring up the image of 
their owners, and thus become an important, perhaps at times indispensable, part of 
the public vocabulary.’” (quoting Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks As Speech: 
Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade 
Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 195-96)). 
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company or product by using its trademark.”17  And this is the natural consequence 
of the University’s claim.  If the University can control an artistic depiction of an 
event in which its players participated, then it can make the same arguments to 
control uses of its name, images of its players, images of its buildings, or any other 
indicia that serve to identify the subject matter of an informational or artistic work. 
There are good reasons that the subjects of discourse are not allowed to 
decide how they will be shown or spoken of, outside the heavily regulated 
boundaries of defamation and privacy law.  The First Amendment barred Jerry 
Falwell from suppressing a depiction of himself that he found humiliating, see 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), and the First Amendment 
likewise protects even more favorable depictions from more subtle censorship.  As 
Doc. 255, Exhibit 20 shows, an artist producing a University-licensed work would 
be subject to NCAA regulations, which require changing players’ names and 
fictionalizing history.  An artist’s freedom to choose to produce a more realistic 
representation should not be subject to the constraints the University has put on its 
own depictions.  Cf. CBC Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major League 
Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that the First 
Amendment trumps ownership claims over facts regarding baseball players). 
                                                           
17. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 
1992); see also Yankee Publ’g Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 
275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that the First Amendment is implicated by 
expressive, rather than commercial, uses of a trademark). 
 27  
 
III. Conclusion 
 
Amici respectfully submit to the Court that, for the foregoing reasons, New 
Life Art’s realistic depiction Alabama football games cannot give rise to a claim 
under the Lanham Act.   
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